Philosopher Peter Singer on Animal Equality
Peter Singer, Professor of Bioethics at Princeton University and Laureate Professor at the Centre for Applied Philosophy and Public Ethics at the University of Melbourne, is considered to be one of the world’s most influential philosophers. In this video, he is interviewed at the Carnegie Council for Ethics in International Affairs by Julia Taylor Kennedy, on October 6, 2011, about whether human beings are superior to — or equal to animals and why.
Singer argues that humans and animals share an important equality, in the capacity to suffer or to enjoy their lives. And that in this we share a moral equality with animals. He says, “I think of it in terms of equality between humans and animals, in a very specific sense, the sense in which they do share an important equality, and that is the capacity to suffer or enjoy their lives. This becomes a moral equality, where their pain ought to count just as much as a human being, just as similarly, their pleasure counts just as much as a human’s pleasure. What I am opposing is discounting or ignoring the pain of animal beings, simply because they are not members of our species. I want to extend equality beyond the species boundary. We should give equal consideration to the interests of all beings, all beings have interests, all can feel pain, irrespective of their species, just like human beings are no different irrespective of their sex, race, or color of their skin. It’s that kind of equality that I want to argue for.”
Singer on Vegetarianism
Singer said he became a vegetarian because he started thinking about the ethical question of treating animals the way we do and slaughtering them for food. He said, “At first, I tried to think of ways of defending and justifying a subordinate status for animals, so that we would be entitled to treat them the way we do. But in the end, I understood and came to the conclusion that we cannot justify a subordinate status for animals, that our treatment of animals for food or other uses is not justifiable, instead we’re practicing speciesism and prejudice, that we think our species is somehow superior just because we’re human, and therefore somehow we’re entitled to use them as a means to an end. But there’s no philosophical principle that you can ground the idea that they (animals) are just things, obviously they are sentient beings and they suffer, they can feel pain just like we do. I’m opposed to animal interests not mattering. That the interests of animals are comparably important do matter.”
Video Length: 3:02 Minutes
Credits:
Produced by: Carnegie Ethics Studio
Held at Carnegie Council for Ethics in International Affairs
Photo by Barbara Oehring